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Monitoring the Misdemeanor Bail Reform
Consent Decree in Harris County, Texas
BY BRANDON L. GARRETT & SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON

M

aranda ODonnell was
driving to her mother’s house to pick up her
four-year-old daughter
when she was stopped by police and
arrested for driving with a suspended
license. As was the practice in many
counties, Harris County judges at the
time set bail according to a fixed cash
bail schedule, with no regard to ability to pay or whether a person posed
a public safety or flight risk. A judge
set ODonnell’s bail at $2,500.1 Like tens
of thousands of others, she could not
afford to make bail and was detained
in jail. If she’d had access to the $250
(nonrefundable) fee that a bondsman
would typically charge, she would have
been released within a few hours, like
so many people of means. As a poor
person, however, she remained locked
up solely on account of her poverty.
She could not buy her release from jail.
Just like ODonnell, who joined with
other plaintiffs to challenge the Harris
County bail system in federal court,
people across the country face bail
systems that have operated in a similarly unfair fashion. For people with

the means to pay money bail (or to
pay ten percent of the bail as a nonrefundable fee to a bail bondsman), an
arrest has minimal disruptive effect on
their lives. Within hours of an arrest,
a person with money can walk out of
jail and return to her job or to care for
her children. The trauma and danger
of time spent in jail is also minimal.
But for the poor person, an arrest for
a minor crime can have devastating
effects. Those effects are heightened
during and after COVID-19, as jails
have become some of the nation’s largest epicenters of the pandemic.
We have now served for one-and-ahalf years as court-appointed monitors
in the ODonnell case. We write to
describe the litigation and to offer
our perspective on how the misdemeanor bail system in Harris County
has changed since that litigation
began.2 The ODonnell Consent Decree
that resulted from the lawsuit has the
potential to set an important model for
pretrial reform. We describe what that
consent decree provides and the work
to come.

THE MISDEMEANOR
BAIL REFORM LAWSUIT
IN HARRIS COUNTY
In 2016, ODonnell and other plaintiffs
charged with misdemeanors brought
a federal class action against Harris
County and moved for a preliminary
injunction to end the practices that
led to these detentions. The complaint
noted that, on a typical night, 500 people arrested for misdemeanors were
detained in the Harris County jail,3
and that, between 2009 and 2015, 55
people who could not afford bail died
in Harris County jail while awaiting
trial.4 It bears reiterating that these
people were not in jail serving a sentence after being convicted of a crime
— they were merely accused of misdemeanor offenses and awaiting their
day in court.
At the time ODonnell filed the lawsuit, arrestees in Harris County
appeared before magistrates without
the assistance of attorneys to speak on
their behalf. Nor were they allowed to
speak in their own defense. They were
not informed of their rights. In hear-
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ings that typically lasted for a minute
or two, magistrates almost invariably
set monetary bail amounts according
to a fixed bail schedule, without regard
to a person’s ability to pay.5 People like
ODonnell, who were too poor to post
a financial bond, languished in the
Harris County jail. And studies show
that holding low-risk people in jail,
even for just a day or two, significantly
increased their likelihood of committing another crime after release.6 The
system made the public less safe by
needlessly locking up poor people.
The unfairness of the Harris County
misdemeanor bail practices also exacerbated racial disparities in the Harris
County jail population. As the federal district court found, a 2011 study
showed that in Harris County, 70 percent of white misdemeanor arrestees
obtained early pretrial release from
detention, but only 52 percent of
Latino misdemeanor arrestees and 45
percent of African American misdemeanor arrestees did.7
While convictions for nonviolent
drug offenses have driven mass incarceration in federal and state prisons,
the money bail system has driven it in
county jails, wasting taxpayer dollars
to lock up the poor and, disproportionately, racial minorities, for no reason
other than their inability to pay. Chief
Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, of the United
States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, relied on a comprehensive set of factual findings in
concluding that “Harris County’s [bail]
policy and practice violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the United States Constitution.”8

THE ODONNELL CONSENT
DECREE
After three years of litigation, including an appeal to the U.S. Court of
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holding low-risk
people in jail, even
for just a day or
two, significantly
increased their
likelihood of
committing another
crime after release.
The system made
the public less
safe by needlessly
locking up poor
people.

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the parties reached a settlement resulting in
a landmark consent decree, approved
on Nov. 21, 2019.9 The ODonnell consent decree represents the first federal
court–supervised remedy governing
bail. It sets forth a blueprint for creating a constitutional and transparent
pretrial system to protect the due process and equal protection rights of
misdemeanor arrestees. The terms of
the decree envision transformative,
lasting change.10
First, the decree sets out categories of arrestees who are entitled
to a prompt release. It incorporates
the new Amended Local Rule 9 of
the Harris County Criminal Courts at
Law,11 which had been adopted by the
county criminal court judges — many
of whom had won their first elections as judges running on campaign
promises to improve the bail system.12
The rule rescinded the prior secured
money bail schedule, provided for a
new set of procedures, and required
the prompt release of misdemeanor
arrestees, except for six “carve-

out” categories of offenses. Persons
arrested for misdemeanors that do
not fall within the six categories of
carve-out offenses must be promptly
released under a personal bond or
a General Order Bond.13 Persons
arrested for the six types of carve-out
offenses must receive a hearing.
Second, the decree requires far more
robust procedural protections at misdemeanor bail hearings, mandating
that judges make their findings “by
clear and convincing evidence” that
the arrestee has the ability to pay the
amount required, or does not have
that ability to pay but that “no less-restrictive condition or combination of
conditions” could “reasonably” prevent
flight from prosecution and protect
the safety of the community.
A hearing officer now must explain
to an arrestee:
I cannot order that you be detained
or require you to pay an unaffordable amount of money bail as a
condition of release unless I make
a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that no other condition or
combination of conditions is adequate to reasonably assure public
safety or to reasonably protect
against flight from prosecution.
Further, a hearing officer must explain:
I must identify and explain the
reasons for my decision and the
evidence and information I relied
on in making that decision on
the record, so that you can challenge the decision at a later date.
Requiring unaffordable money
bail or ordering you detained must
be the last resort, and I will order
detention after this hearing only if
I make a finding that there are no
alternatives for reasonably assur-
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ing the safety of the community
and reasonably protecting against
your flight from prosecution.
That requirement reflects the constitutional standard, drawing on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in United
States v. Salerno, which held that pretrial detention was permissible under
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
only where the government provided
a robust, adversarial, on-the-record
hearing and a judge made a finding
by clear and convincing evidence that
detention was necessary.14 It is also
consistent with prior cases that held
that, under the Due Process Clause,
when the government seeks to detain
a person presumed innocent and not
yet convicted of any crime, and seeks
to deprive that person of liberty, it
must do so only based on a strong evidentiary showing.
Importantly, the decree provides
that all persons charged with misdemeanors are guaranteed the right to
a public defender or other counsel at
a bail hearing, and that such counsel shall have access to the client and
the discovery needed to prepare for
the bail hearings.15 Harris County has
now implemented a system for electronic discovery to ensure that counsel
has the documents needed to prepare
before the hearings.
The decree provides that a person is
“indigent,” and cannot be assessed any
fees associated with bond or conditions of release, if that person lacks the
ability to pay any amount of secured
bail and if they struggle to meet basic
necessities. “Indigency” includes individuals who are deemed indigent
under indigent defense guidelines;
who are homeless; who themselves
or whose dependents receive public
assistance; whose household income
does not exceed 200 percent of the
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federal poverty guidelines; and who
are currently incarcerated.16
Third, following this pretrial stage,
the decree provides for improved procedures upon release, including an
improved approach towards scheduling and notifying people regarding
court appearances. People who have
misdemeanor cases now benefit from
a clear and consistent court appearance policy, which sets forth options
for waiving or rescheduling appearances. Further, Harris County is now
implementing a new court notification
system, studying the causes of nonappearance, and conducting trainings on
the decree policies. Harris County has
retained the National Association for
Public Defense to study and suggest
improvements in standards for indigent defense in misdemeanor cases.
Fourth, the decree provides that
robust data will be made available,
including information on misdemeanor
pretrial release and detention decisions, demographic and socioeconomic
information on each misdemeanor
arrestee, and also historical data dating back to 2009.17 The decree provides
for public meetings and input, county
reports published every 60 days, and
online information regarding implementation of the decree.18
Finally, the decree calls for a monitor tasked with a set of responsibilities
to evaluate decree compliance and
to approve a range of decisions to be
made as the decree is implemented.
On March 3, 2020, we were honored to
be appointed to serve as the monitors
for the consent decree. We have since
provided two reports to Chief Judge
Rosenthal at the conclusion of each
six-month period during our work.
Here, we provide an overview of our
work and of our findings during our
first year.19

OUR MONITORING WORK
Implementing the Consent Decree
The principal task of this monitorship
is to report to the court as we oversee
and support the Harris County officials
who are implementing a new pretrial
justice system. The goals of that system are to restore the public’s trust,
safeguard constitutional rights, and in
fact accomplish the twin aims of bail: to
keep the community safe and promote
the integrity of the judicial proceedings by preventing people from fleeing
justice. Thus, as the decree summarizes in its introduction, the decree “is
intended to create and enforce constitutional and transparent pretrial
practices and systems that protect due
process rights and equal protection
rights of misdemeanor arrestees.”20
The entire first year of our work
was marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has upended all of our
lives. The pandemic has added a new
deadly risk for people detained in a
custodial facility. The first COVID-19
case was reported in the Harris County
Joint Processing Center on March 29,
2020, shortly after our appointment as
monitors. The Harris County Sheriff’s
Office (HCSO) adopted a range of precautions in response to the pandemic.
Nevertheless, the sheriff reported
on Jan. 12, 2021, that the “jail is bursting at the seams,” and “new inmates
who test positive have no place to
quarantine because the surveillance
tank is full and the general population is grid-locked.” Additionally, “[s]ix
inmates and two HCSO staff members
have died from the virus.”21 The HCSO
administered over 25,000 COVID-19
tests. From March 29, 2020, through
January 2021, a total of 1,558 COVID-19
positive inmates were released from
the jail, of which 49 were charged with
misdemeanors only, and of which 1,115
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were charged with a misdemeanor and
a felony offense. As of Jan. 27, 2021, of
the 1,082 COVID-19 positive persons
in the jail, 12 persons were COVID19 positive and charged solely with a
misdemeanor. An additional 286 were
charged with a misdemeanor and a felony offense.22
Despite the crisis posed by COVID19, which has meant that many county
administrators have been working
remotely, remarkable progress has
already been made as a result of Rule 9
and the consent decree. A new system
of electronic discovery was created to
provide information to defense counsel prior to bail hearings; new court
appearance rules have been implemented (with court appearances and
setting types captured beginning Dec.
5, 2020); and trainings on the misdemeanor bail process have begun (on
Dec. 11, 2020). In addition, a new misdemeanor pretrial-disposition form that
better reflects the consent decree process was adopted and implemented by
criminal court judges.
Empirical Findings
In Harris County, secured money bonds
are no longer required for most misdemeanor cases under Rule 9. Most
people are released promptly without a
hearing. As a result, the number of misdemeanor arrestees who are released
has dramatically increased, and the
reliance on cash bail for and detention of those who lack the resources to
make bail has dramatically decreased.
For example, we find that in recent
years a larger proportion of persons
arreseted for misdemeanors have been
released from jail either on the same
day or one day after being booked into
jail. In more than 80 percent of the
cases since 2017, people arrested for
misdemeanors spent two days or fewer
in jail before their release (80 percent
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in 2017, 82 percent in 2018, 85 percent
in 2019, and 86 percent in 2020). The
largest reductions in the length of pretrial detention are observed in 2017 and
2019, the years when the ODonnell preliminary injunction and Rule 9 became
effective, respectively.
The reforms likely had an important
impact on the types of bonds approved
for misdemeanor arrestees, substantially reducing arrestees’ financial
burdens. Prior to the implementation of
Rule 9 in 2019, most misdemeanor cases
did not involve a personal or General
Order Bond. This meant that most people were held on secured bonds, so that
they could not obtain release unless
they had the money to pay a fee to a
bail bondsperson. In 2015, virtually
every misdemeanor case (92 percent)
had a secured money bond set. In 2020,
that share was down to just 14 percent.
Most people, therefore, did not have to
pay cash up front to obtain a release in
a misdemeanor case. As a result, there
has been a stunning drop in the cost of
bonds set by the courts since the implementation of Rule 9, from $135 million
in 2015 to $13 million in 2020 — onetenth of the previous amount.
These reforms have resulted in far
more people released to the community, who would otherwise have been
jailed based on inability to pay, and they
have also benefited public safety. The
rate of repeat offending has remained
largely stable — and appears even
to have slightly declined. We have
observed, in general, slightly declining rates of individual people arrested
for misdemeanors who repeat-offend
in each year from 2015 to 2019 (from
23.4 percent in 2015 to 20.5 percent in
2019). Recall that the misdemeanor bail
reforms took effect in early 2019. We do
observe a slight increase in the share of
misdemeanor cases that are followed
by a new felony case (from 10.7 percent

in 2015 to 11.4 percent in 2019). Nor did
the number of “frequent flyers” change.
Only about one percent of the people
arrested for a misdemeanor offense in
2019 were re-arrested on four or more
separate occasions within 365 days, a
rate that has not substantially changed
from 2015 to 2019. We also observe that
people arrested who had mental-health
flags and who were recorded as homeless were about twice as likely to be
re-arrested than other people arrested.
We are concerned that so many persons
in vulnerable populations cycle through
the misdemeanor system and are continuing to study that problem.
Previously, the share of Black arrestees who bonded out (through either
cash or personal bonds) was much
lower than white arrestees, especially
in 2015 and 2016. But since the adoption
of Rule 9 in early 2019, this disparity has almost entirely disappeared. A
gender gap, with female persons more
likely to bond out in earlier years, has
also gradually declined over time. We
have seen little change from 2015 to
2019 in the sex and racial distribution
of misdemeanor arrestees, but we have
seen a gradual increase in the share of
Latinx misdemeanor arrestees.
Much of the central architecture
of misdemeanor bail reform is now
in place. However, important work
remains as we assist county officials in
reaching their goal to build a model system for misdemeanor pretrial justice.
Implementation of a range of policies
will occur in the months ahead, including court appearance notification and
scheduling options, indigent defense
planning, and ongoing training. Also
forthcoming are a series of additional
data analyses, including regarding
court appearances, merits outcomes,
and further analysis of recidivism
outcomes, together with feedback
on Harris County’s work creating a
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fully functional data portal for misdemeanor cases. We continue to conduct
cost-benefit analyses of this bail reform
undertaking in Harris County.
Bail Reform in Harris County,
Texas, and Nationally
Ironically, although Harris County has
experienced excellent early results in
transforming its misdemeanor bail
system, some local law enforcement
officials have expressed dismay at the
changes, pointing to examples of individuals who committed murders while
out on personal bonds or on low money
bonds after an arrest for a prior violent
crime.23 We note that homicides and
shootings have gone up in a wide range
of jurisdictions across the country. At
the same time, in Harris County, as in
many other jurisdictions nationwide, a
wide range of crimes, including other
violent crimes like simple assault, have
also declined during the pandemic.24
These patterns during the pandemic
year will no doubt be much studied
by criminologists. One thing is clear:
The national spike in firearms violence
cannot likely be attributed to any particular localities’ practices or policies.
Some elected officials have made disparaging statements about the new
bail system, which has made it more
difficult for us as monitors to help
the community understand that the
changes brought about under the consent decree have clearly produced
positive results. What detractors of
the new bail system seem to misunderstand is this: The consent decree
applies only to misdemeanor cases. For
people charged with serious violent
crimes in felony cases, there has been
no “bail reform.” Further, under the
consent decree, individuals charged
with specific categories of serious
misdemeanors are not automatically
entitled to release on personal bonds.
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These reforms
have resulted in
far more people
released to the
community,
who would
otherwise have
been jailed
based on inability
to pay, and
they have also
benefited public
safety. The rate
of repeat offending
has remained
largely stable —
and appears
even to have
slightly declined.
Serious misdemeanor cases (as is generally also true in felony cases) must
have bail decided at hearings before
magistrates who have the full panoply
of options that have always been available: personal bonds, secured financial
bonds, and other conditions of release
such as protective orders, GPS monitoring, and the like. For those serious
misdemeanor cases, judges have the
authority to require secured financial bonds at whatever amount they
deem appropriate. Indeed, the consent
decree actually addresses the dangers
of a cash bail system, whereby individuals who pose a public safety threat can
nevertheless pay to make a cash bond,
obtain release, and then proceed to
re-offend. Thus, the complaints about
“bail reform” are misplaced, and are
really complaints about recent decisions made by magistrates and judges

in setting bail under the same cash-bail
oriented rules that have existed for
many years.
At the state level, the concerns
expressed regarding bail have spurred
the Texas Governor to make fixing the
state’s “broken bail system” a major
priority for the current legislative
session.25 Presently, Texas legislators
are considering two bills that would
reform the bail system in dramatically
different ways. One bill would reduce
the state’s reliance on financial bonds
and move the state toward risk-based
bail determination, utilizing validated
risk-assessment instruments and disallowing fixed bail schedules. At the same
time, this bill would broaden preventive detention by increasing the list of
charges for which bail can be denied, as
well as disallowing personal bonds for
a broader list of more serious charges.26
By contrast, the other bill would
instead explicitly allow the use of fixed
bail schedules, eliminate the authority
of magistrates to issue personal bonds
to most people, and make it hard for
charity bail organizations to operate
in the state.27 This bill would require
pretrial hearings for large numbers of
persons across Texas, who under current court rules would be eligible for
prompt release. This bill would have
the effect of moving the state toward
a broader use of secured financial
bonds across the board. If adopted, this
bill would impose enormous costs on
hearing officers, judges, and local governments. The bill would also conflict
with some of the terms of the ODonnell
Consent Decree. Concerns about this
conflict have motivated the Harris
County Commissioners Court to vote
(along party lines) to condemn the bill.28
The County’s Justice Administration
Department has testified against the
bill, positing that the bill could “expos[e]
Harris County to costly litigation” and
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noting that the ODonnell litigation has
already “cost Harris County taxpayers
$60-$100 million.”29
It remains to be seen, as of this
writing, whether the state will adopt
legislation that will pose a conflict with
the rules required under the federal
consent decree. Regardless of what
legislation the Texas legislature may
adopt, we expect that Harris County
will continue to follow the criminal
court rules for misdemeanor bail as
required under the consent decree. But
we watch with concern as the legislation moves forward.
There are lessons to be learned nationally from the Harris County experience. Indeed, other jurisdictions
have looked to the ODonnell Consent
Decree when considering how to
improve their own pretrial systems,
or they have adopted similar models
for similar reasons. In February 2021,
Illinois lawmakers adopted a statewide
reform, titled the “Illinois Pre-Trial
Fairness Act,” as part of a package of
criminal justice measures. The statute
adopts the same standard set out in the
ODonnell consent decree, the Salerno
rule that: “All defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release, and
the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence”
that the person poses a specific public
safety threat or a flight risk.30 Further,
prior to pretrial hearings, the state
must provide discovery, including copies of the person’s criminal history
and any statements by the defendant
to be relied on by the state, as well as
any police reports. A person has the
right to counsel at such hearings. The
Illinois approach very much follows
the approach adopted in this consent
decree, and it will be implemented over
the next two years.
We also note that the constitutional
approach underlying the ODonnell con-
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The American Bar
Association has
recommended
since 1998 that
counsel be present
at all bail hearings,
and in 2007
recommended
a clear and
convincing
evidence standard
for pretrial
decision-making.
It is noteworthy,
however, that these
recommendations
are only recently
being implemented
in a comprehensive
way in large
jurisdictions.
sent decree has recently been cited by
the California Supreme Court in a similar case.31 In its ruling, the California
court found a due process violation in
the use of money bail without taking
into account the defendant’s ability to
pay and without considering whether
less-restrictive alternatives could adequately protect the public, the victim,
and ensure a person’s appearance in
court.32 Further, a preliminary consent
judgment in a civil rights case brought
in Alamance County, North Carolina,
has also adopted key elements mirroring the ODonnell Consent Decree’s
approach, including the use of a Salerno
standard.33
Of course, the ODonnell Consent
Decree itself reflects preexisting mod-

els. For example, the American Bar
Association has recommended since
1998 that counsel be present at all bail
hearings, and in 2007 recommended
a clear and convincing evidence standard for pretrial decision-making.34
It is noteworthy, however, that these
recommendations are only recently
being implemented in a comprehensive way in large jurisdictions.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the misdemeanor bail system
in Harris County has already undergone a remarkable transition. This
model includes a broad set of categorical entitlements to release, far more
robust hearing procedures, and supportive services upon release. The
empirical findings after the first year
of monitoring show positive trends:
more arrestees released pretrial without financial conditions attached, a
stable or slightly reduced rate of reoffending by those released pretrial, and
a reduction in the racial and gender
disparities in pretrial releases. We are
grateful for the opportunity to serve as
court-appointed monitors as this transformation continues in the years ahead.

1

2

3
4
5

Class Action Complaint at 1, ODonnell v. Harris
Cty., No. 4:16-cv-01414 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2016),
ECF No. 3; Meagan Flynn, Group Sues Harris
County Over Bail System that Keeps People in Jail
Just Because They’re Poor, Hous. Press, May 20,
2016, https://www.houstonpress.com/news/
group-sues-harris-county-over-bail-systemthat-keeps-people-in-jail-just-because-theyrepoor-8417193.
This piece substantially updates an earlier piece
published in the Houston Lawyer in Fall, 2019.
Our second monitor report, dated March 3,
2021, is available here: https://sites.law.duke.
edu/odonnellmonitor/wp-content/uploads/
sites/26/2021/03/ODonnell-Monitor-Second-Report-v.-31.pdf.
Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
Memorandum and Opinion Setting Out Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ODonnell
v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1100–01 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 28, 2017), ECF No. 302 (“The court finds

Published by the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law. Reprinted with permission.
© 2021 Duke University School of Law. All rights reserved. JUDICATURE.DUKE.EDU

Judicature

BRANDON L.
GARRETT is the
L. Neil Williams, Jr.
Professor of Law at
Duke Law School and
director of the Wilson
Center for Science and
Justice. A leading scholar of criminal justice
outcomes, evidence, and constitutional
rights, Garrett conducts research and teaches
in the areas of forensic science, eyewitness
identification, corporate crime, constitutional
rights and habeas corpus, and criminal
justice policy.
SANDRA
GUERRA
THOMPSON is
the Newell H. Blakely
Professor of Law
and director of the
Criminal Justice
Institute at the
University of Houston Law Center. She is
widely published in the areas of criminal
law, evidence, the regulation of forensic
science, and federal asset forfeiture. She is
an elected member of the American Law
Institute since 1999 and was appointed
to the Board of Advisors for the ALI’s
sentencing reform project.

6

7

8
9

10

and concludes that in the typical case, Hearing
Officers set secured money bail as a condition of
detention operating only against those who are
indigent and cannot pay the bail, rather than as
a mechanism for pretrial release.”).
Prior research in Harris County has found that
for similarly situated individuals, those detained
for misdemeanors pretrial were “25% more
likely to be convicted and 43% more likely to
be sentenced to jail.” Paul Heaton, Sandra G.
Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 717 (2017).
Memorandum and Opinion Setting Out Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ODonnell, 251 F.
Supp. 3d at 1122.
Id. at 1060.
Consent Decree, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., No.
4:16-cv-01414 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2019), ECF No.
708.
Id. ¶12 (“[T]he terms of this Consent Decree are
intended to implement and enforce fair and

47

transparent policies and practices that will
result in meaningful, lasting reform . . . .”).
11
Memorandum and Opinion Approving the
Proposed Consent Decree and Settlement
Agreement and Granting the Motion to Authorize Compensation of Class Counsel, ODonnell v.
Harris Cty., No. 4:16-cv-01414, 2019 WL 6219933
at *5–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2019), ECF No. 707.
Amended Local Rule 9 of the Harris County
Criminal Courts at Law was adopted on Feb. 16,
2019, nine months before the decree went into
effect.
12
See Maura Ewing, Harris County Judges May
Face a Reckoning Over Bail On Election Day, Tex.
Observer (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.texasobserver.org/harris-county-judges-may-face-areckoning-over-bail-on-election-day/; Brian
Rogers, Republican judges swept out by voters
in elections, Hous. Chron. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://
www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/
article/GOP-Free-Zone-Republican-judgesswept-out-by-13376806.php.
13
“The General Order Bond is a judicial release
order, requiring the Sheriff, pursuant to judicial
order, to release the arrestee from Harris County custody. The bond is pre-approved by the
CCCL Judges or the Presiding Judge.” Consent
Decree, supra note 9, at n.73.
14
481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987); see also Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979).
15
Consent Decree, supra note 9, at ¶30 § 9.12.1.
16
Id. ¶17(h).
17
Id. ¶¶83–85.
18
Id. ¶¶87–88.
19
Both reports, as well as other documents concerning our work, are available on our monitor
website, at: https://sites.law.duke.edu/odonnellmonitor/.
20
Consent Decree, supra note 9, at ¶2.
21
Report of Sheriff Ed Gonzalez January 12, 2021
And Request for Emergency Hearing, Russell v.
Harris Cty., No. 4:19-cv-00226 (Jan. 12, 2021), ECF
No. 364.
22
Sheriff Ed Gonzalez and Ericka Brown, Effectively Managing the Health of the Harris County
Jail Population During a Pandemic, IN SESSION
(Just. Admin. Dep’t. Newsletter), February 2021,
https://myemail.constantcontact.com/JADNewsletter---Vol--4-February-2021.html?soid=1134847033030&aid=Cx7yjQD-dUY.
23
The former Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo
and the Harris County District Attorney Kim
Ogg have been vocal critics of “bail reform,”
expressing a concern that judges are not
adequately safeguarding the public. See,
e.g., Rise in Violent Crime with Art Acevedo &
Chuck Wexler, Wash. Post Live (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2021/03/11/rise-violent-crimewith-art-acevedo-chuck-wexler/ (Chief Acevedo states that some people “have taken that bail
reform mentality . . . and they’re applying it to
. . . people charged with murder, with robbery,”
and that such people are being released “on
$300 bonds, on $1,000 bonds.”); Andrew Schneider, Proposed GOP Bail Legislation would put
Harris County at Legal Risk, Texas Senators Hear,
Hous. Pub. Media (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.
houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/criminal-justice/2021/03/18/393915/supporters-andopponents-of-gop-bail-reform-clash-in-senate-

hearing/ (stating that Harris County District
Attorney Kim Ogg testified about an increase of
individuals released on bond and who commit
new offenses).
24
For a detailed analysis, see Memorandum
from the Harris County Justice Administration
Department, Data On Crime, Overall Crime
Trends in the City of Houston and Harris County,
ODonnell Consent Decree Implementation,
and Solutions to Address Violence and Support
Crime Survivors (Feb. 16, 2021), https://jad.
harriscountytx.gov/Portals/70/documents/
FOR%20COURT%20SUBMISSION%202021-0207%20Bail%20Reform%20Crime%20and%20
Violence%20Memo.pdf?ver=cWZ8pdlXqfIp7Oki_oXA8g%3d%3d.
25
See Jeremy Wallace, Gov. Greg Abbott calls for
another fix to ‘broken bail system,’ Hous. Chron.
(Jan. 21. 2021), https://www.houstonchronicle.
com/politics/texas/article/Gov-Greg-Abbottcalls-for-another-fix-to-15888901.php.
26
H.B. 20, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021), https://
capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/pdf/
HB00020I.pdf#navpanes=0.
27
S.B. 21, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021), https://
capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/html/
SB00021I.htm.
28
Andrew Schneider, Harris County Leaders Vote
to Condemn GOP-Backed Bail Legislation in the
Texas Senate, Hous. Pub. Media (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/
news/criminal-justice/2021/03/30/394745/harris-county-leaders-condemn-gop-bail-reformbill/.
29
See Schneider, supra note 23.
30
725 ILCS 5/110.6.1.
31
In re Kenneth Humphrey, 482 P.3d 1008 (Cal.
Mar. 25, 2021).
32
Id. at 1018–19.
33
Consent Order for Preliminary Injunction,
Allison v. Allen, No. 19-cd-1126 (M.D.N.C. May 8,
2020), ECF No. 56.
34
Expanded Pretrial Release, Am. Bar Ass’n. (Feb.
22, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/resources/
covid-19-resources/expanded-pretrail-release/.

